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A limited but accumulating body of research and theoretical commentary offers support for core claims of the “institutional-anomie theory” of crime (IAT) 
and points to areas needing further development. In this paper, which focuses on violent crime, we clarify the concept of social institutions, elaborate 
the cultural component of IAT, derive implications for individual behavior, summarize empirical applications, and propose directions for future research. 
Drawing on Talcott Parsons, we distinguish the “subjective” and “objective” dimensions of institutional dynamics and discuss their interrelationship. We 
elaborate on the theory’s cultural component with reference to Durkheim’s distinction between “moral” and “egoistic” individualism and propose that a 
version of the egoistic type characterizes societies in which the economy dominates the institutional structure, anomie is rampant, and levels of violent 
crime are high. We also offer a heuristic model of IAT that integrates macro- and individual levels of analysis. Finally, we discuss briefly issues for the further 
theoretical elaboration of this macro-social perspective on violent crime. Specifically, we call attention to the important tasks of explaining the emergence 
of economic dominance in the institutional balance of power and of formulating an institutional account for distinctive punishment practices, such as the 
advent of mass incarceration in the United States.
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1. Introduction
The influence of the anomie perspective in criminology has 
risen and fallen over the past seven decades or so. Merton’s 
well known formulation, which was originally published in 
1938, dominated sociological inquiry into crime during the 
1950s and 1960s, only to be relegated by some to the dustbin 
of criminological history (Hirschi 1969; Kornhauser 1978; 
see also Messner and Rosenfeld 2007, 12–14). However, 
researchers have subsequently responded to critiques of ear-
lier formulations of anomie theory, crafted expanded ver-
sions of the theory, and applied the theory in novel ways. To 
paraphrase Mark Twain, developments in the discipline in 
the latter years of the twentieth century and the beginning 
of the twenty-first century suggest that the earlier reports of 
the death of anomie theory had been greatly exaggerated. 
One effort to revive and revitalize the anomie perspective 
in criminology has been the formulation of “institutional-
anomie” theory (hereafter IAT). The core arguments of this 
approach were initially presented as part of an explana-
tion of the comparatively high rates of serious crime in the 
United States (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). Over time, 
these arguments have evolved into a theoretical framework 
with more general applicability. The distinguishing feature 
of IAT is its principal focus on culture and social structure 
as manifested in social institutions. Following in the spirit 
This research was supported by the Center for Inter-
disciplinary Research at Bielefeld University, Ger-
many, which organized a research group on “Control 
of Violence,” directed by Wilhelm Heitmeyer and 
Heinz-Gerhard Haupt. We are grateful to the mem-
bers of the research group for their feedback on a 
presentation based on this research, and to Susanne 
Karstedt and an anonymous reviewer for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript.
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of Durkheimian sociology, IAT is built upon the underly-
ing premise that the “normal” levels and forms of criminal 
activity in any society reflect the fundamental features of 
social organization.
In this paper, we seek to further advance the IAT research 
program by clarifying key concepts, elaborating the argu-
ments about the impact of social organization on levels 
of violent crime, and extending the scope of the theory. 
We begin with a formal treatment of the core concept of 
“institutions,” explaining how it has been derived from and 
expands upon the classic conceptualization employed by 
Talcott Parsons (1990 [1934]).1 This exercise in conceptual 
clarification is fruitful for two reasons. One, it highlights 
the central role of cultural values in understanding institu-
tional dynamics. We take this important insight as a point 
of departure for explicating in greater detail than in previ-
ous statements of the theory the kinds of fundamental value 
orientations that are theorized to be conducive to perva-
sive criminal violence in the advanced societies. Two, our 
explication of the concept of “institutions” draws attention 
to some of the individual-level processes upon which IAT 
implicitly rests. Concrete human actors ultimately produce 
and reproduce the institutional dynamics that operate at 
the macro level. A comprehensive statement of IAT thus 
requires identification of the linkages between the level of 
social systems and the level of individual action. By elabo-
rating cultural processes and identifying the multilevel 
linkages implicit in IAT, we can uncover new “puzzles” that 
might stimulate research on violent crime in the future.2
2. The Concept of “Social Institutions”
As noted, IAT adopts a conceptualization of “institutions” 
that is derived from Parsons’ work on general sociological 
theory (see also Bellah et al. 1991, 287–306) and is compat-
ible with more recent applications in other social science 
disciplines. Parsons explains that two valid approaches to 
the study of institutions can be differentiated: the “subjec-
tive” and the “objective” (Parsons 1990 [1934], 319). The 
former adopts the viewpoint of the actor and is essential for 
understanding individual-level behavior. The latter refers to 
the perspective of the sociological observer and is particu-
larly relevant to the characterization of the institutional 
order in society at large.
From the subjective point of view, institutions play an 
influential role in guiding “action,” which generally involves 
some kind of “means-ends” relationship.3 Actors formulate 
goals (ends), and they choose “suitable” means (or ways) of 
obtaining these goals. The “suitability” of the means can be 
determined with reference to a specified standard of ratio-
nality. The precise standard of rationality invoked differs 
depending on the nature of the ends. For example, the ap-
propriate standards for assessing the rationality of empirical 
ends (e.g., securing resources) differ from those that pertain 
to transcendental ends (e.g., attaining salvation). 
Individual actors have multiple ends and multiple sets of 
means that involve “complex ‘chains’ of means-ends rela-
tionships, so constituted that the ‘end’ of one sector of the 
chain is a means to some further end” (Parsons 1990 [1934], 
322). Moreover, for social order to exist, different individu-
als must coordinate their actions. Parsons assumes that this 
can only occur if there is an appreciable degree of integra-
tion of ultimate ends among those in a social system. In 
other words, he assumes that a concrete, on-going society 
presupposes a value system that is to some meaningful de-
gree shared or common to the members of that society. Of 
course, not all people embrace every single value, and even 
those who accept the values do not always act in ways com-
patible with them. Nevertheless, Parsons maintains that a 
situation lacking any agreement on ultimate values would 
be highly unstable and would likely lead to chaos, i.e., the 
Hobbessian state of nature, the war of all against all.
The common value system is, therefore, the foundation on 
which social institutions rest for Parsons. The members of 
society collectively formulate or accept rules, or regulatory 
1 A preliminary effort along these lines can be 
found in Messner and Rosenfeld (2004).
2 See Cole (1975) for a discussion of problem-
generation as a key latent function of theories.
3 Parsons has often been accused of overex-
tending the means-ends conceptualization of 
action, blurring, for example, the distinctive 
features of habitual or expressive behaviour and 
glossing over the human potential for creativ-
ity (see, e.g., Joas 1997). In the context of our 
present discussion we let this matter rest.
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norms, that govern the means that are judged to be accept-
able in the pursuit of ends. These norms are accompanied 
by sanctions, and they have an obligatory quality surround-
ing them; they are in an important sense “coercive” to use 
Durkheim’s language (1964b [1895]). There are of course a 
multitude of norms that pertain to different forms of behav-
ior, and it is accordingly useful to conceptualize systems of 
regulatory norms that pertain to particular kinds of tasks 
and performances that are commonly differentiated on the 
basis of functional considerations. These systems of rules or 
regulatory norms constitute the major social institutions in 
a society (e.g., the economy, the family, etc.).
Parsons has been legitimately criticized for exaggerating 
the degree of value consensus in concrete societies and for 
largely neglecting the role of factors other than institu-
tional norms that can coordinate action and create social 
order, such as the exercise of raw or “charismatic” power, 
and considerations of self-interest. Similarly, although he 
acknowledges a role for “implicit” rules in constraining be-
havior (1990 [1934], 329), he does not display much apprecia-
tion for the extent to which social interactions are infused 
with taken-for-granted presumptions that have little direct 
relationship to any ultimate value system. Nevertheless, his 
analytic framework introduces some highly useful concep-
tual distinctions for institutional analysis. For example, a 
common approach to institutions is to equate them with 
observed patterns of behavior. From this perspective, be-
haviors that occur with a high degree of regularity are “in-
stitutionalized” behaviors. Parsons, in contrast, restricts his 
conceptualization of institutions to the rules that contribute 
to the emergence of these regular patterns of behavior. A 
very similar approach appears in the “new institutional-
ism” that has emerged in economics, political science, and 
economic sociology in recent decades. As Douglass North 
puts it: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (1990, 3).
The analytic distinction between the “rules of the game” or 
institutional norms and concrete forms of behavior is criti-
cally important because it allows for an empirical assess-
ment of the role of institutional controls in contrast with 
the role of other factors. Parsons recognizes that concrete 
behaviors are determined by many factors, including the 
physical environment, biological heredity, and psychologi-
cal traits (1990 [1934], 320). If institutions are equated with 
behavioral regularities themselves, it is impossible to isolate 
the distinctive contribution of institutional factors in the 
explanation of these behaviors.
Parsons also distinguishes between moral and utilitar-
ian sources of compliance with institutional norms. He 
theorizes that the primary motive for obeying an institu-
tional norm “lies in the moral authority it exercises over the 
individual” (1990 [1934], 326). When a norm is imbued with 
such authority, the actor complies with the norm because 
the prescribed behavior is “good for its own sake” and is not 
merely a means to some other end. The moral authority of 
institutional norms, however, is never perfect. A secondary, 
utilitarian type of control invariably accompanies the moral 
type in ongoing societies. This involves a “calculation of 
advantage” rooted in an appeal to interest, which may take 
the form of positive advantages on the one hand or disad-
vantageous consequences on the other. 
Shifting from the “subjective” to the “objective” view of 
institutions, Parsons goes on to argue that institutions 
themselves can be thought of as constituting a collective 
system. Each institution has implications for others. In 
his words, the institutions are inter-related with respect to 
their mutual “requiredness” (1990 [1934], 332). The norms 
of a given institution are not compatible with just any 
kinds of norms in other institutions. Only some kinds of 
norms would “fit” with others. The degree of fit between 
institutions can be understood as constituting the degree of 
“structural integration” of the institutional order. Parsons 
cites the medieval relations between church and state as an 
instance of weak structural integration. Each of these insti-
tutions “claimed an allegiance which inevitably encroached 
on the requirements of the other” (1990 [1934], 332).
Parsons identifies an additional feature of the institutional 
order—its “regulatory integration” (1990 [1934], 332). This 
refers to the degree to which and the means by which insti-
tutional norms govern behavior in practice. In a hypotheti-
cal society with perfect regulatory integration, conformity 
with the norms would be universal and would be brought 
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about entirely by the moral authority of the norms. Such a 
hypothetical concept is not intended as a “descriptive cat-
egory” but as an “ideal type,” a “polar concept” (1990 [1934], 
332). Such a society will not exist in the empirical world. At 
the opposite end of the continuum is a hypothetical society 
wherein the moral authority of the norms has dissolved. 
Initially, considerations of self-interest might produce 
conformity with social norms in such a society, although 
Parsons anticipates that such a situation would eventually 
result in a “loss of control even by that means” (1990 [1934], 
333). Following Durkheim (1966 [1897]), Parsons uses the 
term “anomie” to refer to the situation in which the moral 
authority of the institutional norms has broken down (see 
also Merton 1964). In essence, a high degree of anomie 
implies that concrete behavior is no longer “institutional-
ized” in the sense of being governed by the moral authority 
of social norms.
In sum, Parsons has put forth a useful, albeit highly ab-
stract, analytic framework for institutional analysis that 
potentially has wide applicability for understanding social 
phenomena. Institutions refer to systems of rules intended 
to control behavior that have the distinctive quality of being 
“moral,” i.e., rooted in some overarching value system.4 
Furthermore, processes of institutional control can be 
understood as operating at dual levels. At the individual 
level, institutional rules constitute part of the environ-
ment confronting actors as they select the means to realize 
their ends. At the macro-level, institutions form different 
configurations exerting constraining but also orienting and 
enabling influences upon the members of society. Though 
these configurations ultimately arise from and are main-
tained by individual and collective actions their emergent 
properties (that need to be theoretically reconstructed) can-
not be (fully) “designed” by specific actors.
3. Institutional-Anomie Theory
IAT builds on and adapts this general framework for 
institutional analysis to explain the specific phenomenon 
of crime. In so doing it also draws liberally on Merton’s 
variant of the anomie perspective (1968:189), incorporating 
in particular his keen insights about the tendency of consid-
erations of technical expediency to override moral concerns 
under conditions of extreme anomie. However, whereas 
Merton places primary emphasis on the stratification sys-
tem when considering the social structural determinants of 
anomie, IAT broadens the focus to include other primary 
institutions of society.5 
3.1. Bringing Institutions into Criminological Theory
Social institutions are to some extent distinct with respect 
to the primary activities around which they are organized, 
which is the basis of conventional classifications of institu-
tions. To illustrate, the system of institutional norms that 
relates to activities pertaining to the subsistence require-
ments of human organisms—food, clothing, shelter—is 
typically labeled the “economy,” though today the economy 
goes far beyond these minimal requirements. The system 
of institutional norms that governs behaviors related to the 
biological reproduction of the species is referred to as the 
family, and so on (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007; see also 
Turner 2003).
The functions associated with the institutional norms are 
necessarily overlapping and interdependent in the sense 
that the functioning of a given institution has consequences 
for the functioning of the others. For example, the perfor-
mance of the economy is dependent on the quality of the 
“human capital” cultivated in the schools. The capacity of 
the schools to develop human capital is circumscribed by 
the individual backgrounds that students bring with them 
from their families. The effective functioning of all three 
of these institutions—the economy, education, and the 
family—presupposes an environment with at least a modi-
cum of social order, for which the polity has formal respon-
sibility. Finally, the effectiveness of the polity in promot-
ing the collective good (at least as perceived by those who 
wield political power) depends on the nature and quality of 
4 It is important to distinguish this usage of the 
term “moral” from a conceptualization that invokes 
a transcendental standard of morality. A concrete 
society might secure compliance with institutional 
norms by virtue of the moral authority that they 
exercise over societal members, but the prescribed 
behaviors might be judged to be immoral accord-
ing to some “ultimate” standard of morality.
5 See Messner (2003a) for an extended discussion of 
poits of overlap and divergence between Merton’s 
theory of social structure and anomie and IAT.
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economic resources and human capabilities supplied by the 
other institutions.
The interdependence of major social institutions implies 
that, for the society to “work” at all, there must be some 
coordination among institutions, just as there must be some 
coordination among the ultimate ends of individual actors. 
The requirements for the effective functioning of any given 
institution, however, may conflict with the requirements 
of another. This potential for conflict is manifested in two 
important ways. One source of conflict involves competing 
demands associated with role performance. Given the fact 
that time is a finite resource, performing a given institution-
al role (e.g., working overtime) may preclude performing 
another role (e.g., taking one’s daughter to soccer practice). 
In addition, the kinds of orientations towards action that 
are appropriate differ in certain important respects depend-
ing on the institutional domain. 
An especially stark contrast can be seen between the 
orientations for interactions embodied in the institutions 
of a market economy and the family. Family relationships 
are expected to be regulated by the norms of particularism, 
affective engagement, and diffuseness, whereas transactions 
in the marketplace are governed by universalism, affective 
neutrality, and specificity (Parsons 1951). Concrete actors are 
thus required to shift their basic orientations towards inter-
actions as they negotiate the different institutional demands 
that they face.
Any given society will therefore be characterized by a 
distinctive arrangement of social institutions that reflects a 
balancing of the sometimes competing claims and req-
uisites of the different institutions, yielding a distinctive 
“institutional balance of power.”6 Indeed, a very useful way 
of classifying whole societies is according to the prevailing 
form of institutional balance. In some societies, such as the 
former Soviet Union, the political system dominates the 
institutional order. In others, the so-called primordial insti-
tutions (family, clan, ethnic group) are dominant. The core 
claim of IAT is that the type of institutional configuration 
that is conducive to high levels of crime in the advanced so-
cieties is one in which the rules of the economy are awarded 
highest priority in the system of institutions. In such a 
society, the economy tends to dominate the institutional 
balance of power, thereby creating institutional imbalance.
Economic dominance is manifested in three principal ways. 
One is devaluation. Non-economic institutional roles tend 
to be devalued relative to economic roles. Non-economic 
roles carry less prestige than economic roles and their occu-
pants receive fewer rewards for effective role performance. 
A second manifestation of economic dominance is accom-
modation. Individuals feel pressures to sacrifice other roles 
to economic roles when conflicts emerge, as when a family 
abandons collective meals because they conflict with mem-
bers’ work schedules. The third manifestation of economic 
dominance is penetration. The logic of the marketplace 
intrudes into other realms of social life. Paying students for 
their educational accomplishments is a particularly stark 
example (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007, 82–83). On a larger 
scale, the increasing commercialization of sports and the 
arts and the “privatization” of public institutions and func-
tions provide countless examples of such intrusions.
Economic dominance in the institutional balance of power 
can be linked specifically with criminal behavior via 
both internalized normative controls and informal social 
controls. With respect to the former, economic norms in 
market capitalist economies are predicated on a calculative 
orientation towards action. Economic thinking, econo-
mizing, intrinsically involves cost/benefit assessments to 
determine how to allocate scarce resources among alterna-
tive uses. In their performance of economic roles, actors are 
thus encouraged to apply “efficiency” norms in the selection 
of the means to achieve their ends, and to accumulate as 
much as possible the prime medium of exchange used in 
economic transactions: money.
6 We use the term “power” in the phrase “in-
stitutional balance of power” in the sense of 
functional primacy and not in the sense of 
political struggles. When an institution domi-
nates the institutional balance of power, the 
claims and requisites of that institution take 
precedence over those of other institutions.
169IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 163 – 181Steven F. Messner et al.: Institutions, Anomie, and Violent Crime: Clarifying and Elaborating Institutional-Anomie Theory
IAT predicts that under conditions of economic dominance 
in the institutional balance of power, the orientation toward 
action associated with the performance of economic roles 
“spills over” into social action more generally. Concrete 
actors are prone to use whatever means are technically 
expedient to realize their ends, regardless of the normative 
status of these means. To return to the language introduced 
above, institutional norms have little moral authority when 
the economy dominates the institutional balance of power. 
The means of social action have been literally de-moralized, 
resulting in anomie.7 Under conditions of extreme anomie, 
the internalized restraints against crime are expected to be 
quite weak. Compliance with institutional norms, including 
legal norms, is thus dependent on the “secondary type of 
control,” i.e., the “calculation of advantage.”
Yet economic dominance tends to undermine this alterna-
tive type of control as well. Economic dominance implies 
that non-economic institutions are enfeebled. The roles 
of these institutions become less attractive; people fail to 
develop strong attachments to them; and the enactment 
of these roles is subservient to the enactment of economic 
roles. The incentives and disincentives associated with non-
economic role performance are thus rendered less salient to 
actors as they orient their behaviors away from such roles. 
Accordingly, the two principal motives for compliance with 
institutional norms explicated above—their moral authority 
and the potency of the incentive/disincentive structures as-
sociated with them—are likely to be weak under conditions 
of economic dominance. It follows that behaviors contrary 
to the norms, including behaviors that violate norms that 
have been codified in criminal law, will be relatively fre-
quent and commonplace.
3.2. The Value Foundations of Economic Dominance in the Institu-
tional Balance of Power and the Explanation of Criminal Violence
IAT thus describes how a specific configuration of social 
institutions and the accompanying normative order it 
represents create a social environment that is more or less 
conducive to criminal behavior by virtue of the operation 
of internalized moral controls and external social controls. 
The original formulation of the theory does not fully ex-
plain, however, the interconnections between institutional 
structure and fundamental cultural values. If institutions 
reflect values that are in some meaningful sense shared and 
“basic” to a society, as argued persuasively by Parsons, then 
any institutional structure that endures for an appreciable 
amount of time, even one that exhibits “imbalance” among 
the constituent institutions, must be grounded in a distinc-
tive set of values.8 
Moreover, the applicability of IAT specifically to violent 
criminal offending—the focus of the present inquiry—
requires explicit consideration. The erosion of the moral 
authority of institutional norms and the weakening of 
external social controls are in principle relevant to the 
explanation of all forms of criminal conduct and of deviant 
behavior more generally. Research by Karstedt and Farrell 
(2006) indicates that insights from IAT can in fact be ap-
plied to explain the so-called “crimes of everyday life,” i.e., 
morally dubious acts, not all of which are technically illegal. 
In addition, a paradox emerges when the applicability of 
7 The “demoralization” of the means of action as 
a result of the penetration of the logic of a market 
economy is not the only possible source of anomie. 
Anomie may reflect features of the normative order 
itself, such as internal inconsistencies among norms 
or lack of clarity in the norms. See Thome (2003; 
2007) for an extended discussion of the different 
subtypes of anomie in Durkheim’s work and, in 
particular, the distinction between “developmen-
tal” or “process induced” anomie and “chronic” 
or “structural” anomie. The former is a temporary 
condition that emerges during periods of rapid 
change; the latter refers to a stable feature of the in-
stitutional order. IAT focuses primarily on “chronic” 
or “structural” anomie, although it has potential 
applicability for other forms of anomie as well.
8 Although we adopt Parsons’ general approach 
to the conceptualization of social institutions, we 
depart here from the spirit of much Parsonian 
sociology in one important respect. Parsons em-
phasizes the smooth functioning of social systems, 
and he thus might have conceived of “economic 
dominance” as a temporary form of structural 
malintegration, one that would be rectified through 
equilibrating mechanisms. We leave open the 
possibility that a social system characterized by 
economic dominance in the institutional balance 
of power is viable and durable, although we expect 
that such a social system will exhibit high rates of 
criminal violence as part of its “normal” function-
ing (see Rosenfeld and Messner forthcoming).
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IAT to violence is considered in historical context. Histori-
cal studies reveal that levels of interpersonal violence, and 
in particular homicide, have declined substantially over 
the course of the past several centuries, at least in Europe, 
where rich historical data are available (Eisner 2003a, 
2003b). How can the institutional dynamics depicted in 
IAT, which pertain to highly developed market societies, 
be reconciled with these documented trends in violence? 
A comprehensive account of the impact of social organiza-
tion on levels of criminal violence requires that the cultural 
underpinnings of economic dominance in the institutional 
balance of power be explicated clearly and fully, and that 
the hypothesized institutional and cultural processes be 
situated within the larger historical context.
We can advance such an account by drawing upon Durk-
heim’s insights about the morality of traditional versus 
advanced, highly differentiated societies.9 In his classic 
formulation of the processes of societal evolution, Durk-
heim (1964a [1893]) explains the transition from primitive 
or segmentally divided to modern societies with reference 
to a fundamental shift in forms of social solidarity—from 
the “mechanical” type to the “organic” type. Durkheim 
also identifies a concomitant erosion of “collectivism” and 
rise in “individualism.” This latter distinction is directly 
relevant to understanding patterns in violence. Specifically, 
Durkheim suggests that “with the progress of civilization 
homicide decreases” (1958 [1950], 113). The reason for this 
trend lies in the demystification of the collectivity and its 
devaluation relative to the “worshipping” of the individual. 
Durkheim construes “collectivism” as an integrative pattern 
in which the group—the family, the clan, a professionally 
defined group, a religious or ethnic community—is valued 
much more than the individual and his or her well-being. 
Premised on this foundational value pattern, Durkheim 
identifies two major, closely intertwined organizing prin-
ciples which, in his view, shaped the institutional order of 
pre-modern European societies and made such an order 
prone to interpersonal violence: honor and a rigidly defined 
social hierarchy, within a society divided into estates. The 
importance of honor and its counterpart, “defamation,” in 
stimulating violent conflict has been widely recognized in a 
variety of contexts and need not be elaborated here (see, for 
example, Nisbett and Cohen 1996; Spierenburg 1998). With 
respect to hierarchy (Roth 2001, 47), we note in particular 
the following aspect. If the group counts more than the in-
dividual, particular persons are typically regarded as closer 
to the gods than the masses; there are leaders and follow-
ers, masters and servants, insiders and outsiders. In other 
words, members of the various strata differ in the amount 
of honor, respect, and general human worth granted them. 
These differences are likely to be criminogenic on their 
own, as indicated in various historical studies (e.g., Rug-
giero 1980; Lehti 2004, with reference to Ylikangas 2001) 
and also in experimental research (Zimbardo et al. 1974).10 
The potential for hierarchy and processes of social margin-
alization to contribute to violence is likely to be relevant 
to the (post-) modern societies as well as to the traditional, 
collectivistic societies.
Durkheim argues that traditional collectivism had to break 
down in the course of an increasingly advanced division of 
labor and the transformation from a segmentally divided, 
rigidly stratified society to a functionally differentiated so-
ciety. In the latter type of society, the individual is no longer 
tied into a closely knit mesh of norms, symbols, and rituals 
that define his or her own identity primarily in terms of be-
longing to a collectivity. The fusion of personal and collec-
tive identities dissolves. The individual’s social standing and 
reputation are no longer defined by a group-specific code of 
honor that, for example, makes blood revenge obligatory.11 
Violence that injures, mutilates, or kills another person 
becomes increasingly repugnant, abominable.
9 The following discussion is based on Thome 
(2007). Advances in historical knowledge and 
sociological theory have corrected and modi-
fied many of Durkheim’s ideas (Fenton 1984, 
Turner 1993). Nevertheless, some of his insights 
are still valid and quite helpful in explaining 
the long-term developments in violent crime.
10 Baumeister et al. (1996) review some of the 
psychological literature confirming the violent 
implications arising from claims of superiority. 
For the connection between sharpened economic 
competition and the “renaturalization” of inequality 
resulting in differential claims of moral worth, i.e. 
superiority, see Bauman (1990) and Young (1958).
11 The code of honor is still relevant in certain situa-
tions involving group relationships, such as adoles-
cent street life in inner city ghettoes (Anderson 1999).
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Although traditional collectivism erodes as societies evolve, 
Durkheim by no means posits a total disappearance of 
collective sentiments (Bellah 1973, xli). There is a “collec-
tive conscience” even in individualized societies, but the 
highest-ranking value is the individual “in general”; not 
just the individual “self” but also the individual “other.” 
This “moral” or “cooperative” individualism respects the 
individual as the carrier of universal rights and obligations. 
As a social praxis, moral individualism is based on mutual 
sympathy and respect for others—any other person. It seeks 
to increase social inclusion, and it postulates the right of 
self-actualization for all. It runs counter to “free-riding” 
practices, promotes adherence to the principles of reciproc-
ity (solidarity based on fairness), and occasionally calls 
for (bearable) sacrifices to help those in need. Cooperative 
individualism thus implies a principled readiness to invest 
in collective goods (like having a democratic government or 
preserving the natural environment) even without calcu-
lable individual payoffs or losses. 
Moving from culture and social praxis (forms of interac-
tion) to the social structural and the political plane, we 
note that cooperative individualism seeks to secure justice 
and to balance personal freedom and equality, mainly by 
combining social welfare provisions and parliamentary 
democracy. Durkheim insists on the functional primacy of 
the state over the economy, because the latter is immanently 
amoral. The state serves as “the organ of moral discipline” 
(1958 [1950], 72), and at the same time it is the champion 
of individualism (1958 [1950], 69). Without the state, the 
individual could not have been set free from primordial 
bonds; without the state, there would be no power to protect 
the individual against the tyrannical claims of the group. 
Durkheim, on the basis of his reading of history, is led to 
the conclusion that “except for the abnormal cases . . . the 
stronger the state, the more the individual is respected” 
(1958 [1950], 57). 12 On the other hand, Durkheim also 
stresses the necessity of counterbalancing the power of the 
state with strong secondary social groups—what politi-
cal scientists and sociologists have later conceptualized as 
various forms of “corporatism” (e.g., Siaroff 1999; Hall and 
Gingerich 2004).
In Durkheim’s view, then, it was mainly the erosion of col-
lectivism that brought about the long-term decline in levels 
of interpersonal violence.13 In his earlier, more optimistic, 
writings he also assumed that the emerging individualism 
would predominantly take on the cooperative form just 
described: the presumably “normal” type of modern society 
that would stabilize the low level of interpersonal violence. 
The new value system implies, among other things, a lower 
level of passion and stronger control of emotions. The 
reason why passions, in particular the impulse to retali-
ate and punish violently, are lower or more constrained 
in individualist cultures seems to be that the person who 
violates the norms (and is to be punished for that) is, so to 
speak, an incarnation of the very object which is now being 
worshipped, i.e., the individual in general (Durkheim 1978 
[1895]).
Durkheim’s account of the large-scale pacification associ-
ated with the growth of individualism is similar in some 
respects to Elias’s views on the “civilizing” process (1982 
[1939]), but with an important distinction. For Elias, the 
disciplinary forces of the advanced societies hold down 
individual impulses; for Durkheim, individuals are freed 
from the closely knit bonds that tied them to the collectiv-
ity. Durkheim also theorizes, however, that the restructured 
agents of social control and moral guidance, particularly 
the nuclear family, the school, professional organizations, 
12 Durkheim’s faith in the capacity of the state to 
serve as “the guardian, promoter and enforcer of 
civic morality” can certainly be challenged given 
subsequent historical developments, as noted by 
Varga (2006, 463). See also Wolfe (1989) for an ex-
tended discussion of how expansion in the authority 
of the state can threaten the vitality of civil society.
13 This thesis has been supported by a statistical 
analysis of crime data available for Germany at 
the end of the nineteenth century (Thome 2002). 
Karstedt (2006) also reports evidence consistent 
with Durkheim’s claim about the effect of the move-
ment from collectivistic to individualistic values on 
levels of violence. In her analysis of cross-national 
variation in homicide rates in the latter decades of 
the twentieth century, she finds that an indica-
tor of individualism is negatively associated with 
levels of homicide. See also Karstedt (2001, 2004).
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and most importantly, the authority of a democratically 
legitimized state, play a critical role in providing the moral 
underpinnings of the new social order.
Thus far we have recounted Durkheim’s thesis of the 
“normal” evolution of cultural values. He also identifies 
an important “pathological” departure from cooperative 
individualism, which he refers to as “egoistic” or “excessive” 
individualism.14 The defining characteristics of this form of 
individualism are hedonistic self-fulfillment instead of so-
cial solidarity; ruthless pursuit of one’s own interests while 
using others as a mere “means” in strategic interactions. 
In the tradition of the Frankfurt School of social thought, 
it is the triumph of “instrumentalism” or, in Habermas’ 
terms (1984), the dominance of strategic interaction over 
communicative action seeking mutual understanding and 
recognition. Durkheim is skeptical about the long term vi-
ability of this type of cultural value system, explaining that 
such orientations are ultimately self-delusive: a meaningful 
life can be found only within solidary social relationships. 
Tocqueville had already warned that materialism and ego-
ism triggered by too much competition would threaten the 
moral base for political democracy.15
We suggest that what Durkheim depicted as a pathologi-
cal but possibly temporary cultural condition is in fact 
compatible with an ongoing institutional order. As noted 
above, the emergence of the new forms of social solidarity 
predicated upon a moral individualism presupposes the ef-
fective operation of the restructured agents of social control 
and moral guidance—the family, the schools, the demo-
cratic state, and other entities associated with civil society. 
However, as described by IAT, economic dominance in the 
institutional balance of power implies that these sources of 
effective social control and moral guidance are rendered 
relatively impotent. The type of individualism that emerges 
along with the erosion of collectivism as societies become 
more highly differentiated is thus likely to give increas-
ing weight to the “egoistic” form rather than the “moral” 
or “cooperative” form. Moreover, under these conditions, 
egoistic individualism at the level of cultural values is likely 
to go hand in hand with anomie at the level of normative 
regulation. The values of this type of individualism do not 
promote social integration; quite the contrary, they interfere 
with effective integration and are distinctly disintegrative 
(Thome 2007). In short, we propose that egoistic or disinte-
grative individualism provides the cultural foundation for 
economic dominance in the institutional balance of power 
and widespread anomie.16 
A heuristic model of our elaborated formulation of IAT is 
presented in Table 1. This model highlights the core features 
of an institutional order that is theorized to be conducive 
to high levels of violent crime in advanced industrial/post-
industrial societies.
14 At this point we somewhat expand Durk-
heim’s concept of egoistic individualism so as to 
bridge the conceptual gap implied in his original 
distinction between egoistic and anomic sui-
cide. One might refer to this modified concept 
under the title of “disintegrative individualism” 
(Thome 2007). Durkheim himself, in several 
passages of Suicide, constructed tenuous bridges 
of this kind. See also footnote 16 below.
15 On the causal connections between a culture of 
competition, social and economic inequality, and 
violence see also Hagan et al. (1998), Jacobs and 
Carmichael (2002), Messner (2003b), and Pesco-
solido and Rubin (2000). An interesting approach 
to studying the anomic consequences of highly 
marketized societies is also offered by Burkatzki 
(2007); see also the Burkatzki paper in this issue. 
Studying data from European surveys conducted 
in 1969 and repeated in 1990, David Halpern 
(2001) finds evidence for increasing importance 
attached to “self-interest.” He also finds a rather 
strong positive relationship between aggregated 
self-interest and national victimization rates, 
particularly when combined with relatively high 
level of social inequality. It fits into this picture that 
of all the various types of criminal violence robbery 
rates exhibit the largest increase since the 1960s.
16 Durkheim himself, in his book on suicide, does 
not interpret egoistic individualism as a force that 
would promote violence; he views it only as an ag-
gravating condition with respect to suicide. Thome 
(2004) has argued that Durkheim’s reasoning is 
not convincing on this point. Dicristina (2004) 
notes that Durkheim concentrates on unpre-
meditated murder which he could more easily 
line up with his notion of “passions” presumably 
preeminent in collectivistic societies. Premedi-
tated murder, instrumental killings, and other 
forms of intentional assault, however, should be 
clearly within the reach of egoistic individual-
ism, particularly so if it is joined with anomie 
in the form of disintegrative individualism.
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Table 1: Predicted rates of homicide under varying economic conditions.
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4. Integrating Levels of Analysis
IAT was originally advanced as a distinctively macro-level 
perspective on the social determinants of crime. The key 
concepts and processes that constitute the theory pertain 
to objective properties of large-scale social systems. It is 
important to recognize, however, that institutions can also 
be approached from the subjective view of concrete actors, 
as stressed by Parsons. The institutional dynamics depicted 
in the heuristic model in Table 1 are ultimately grounded in 
individual-level processes. Institutions emerge from human 
agency, and the level of violent crime in a society is ulti-
mately comprised of the aggregated volume of discrete acts 
of criminal violence. From the vantage point of individual 
actors, violence might be appealing for a variety of reasons. 
It might serve the expressive purpose of inflicting harm on 
others in response to grievances or humiliations, or it might 
be used for the instrumental purpose of securing compli-
ance from others against their will (Tedeschi and Felson 
1994) or eliminating them to obtain some type of external 
“good.” Accordingly, in the absence of salient normative 
considerations and moral obligations, the likelihood that 
violence enters into social interaction increases. 
IAT implies that the probability of selecting violent means 
that are proscribed by the criminal law will be related to 
actors’ orientations towards the institutional norms, their 
valuation of economic roles and goals relative to non-eco-
nomic roles and goals, and their “performance repertoires” 
of economic and non-economic roles and the resources 
available to them. With respect to orientations towards 
norms, the distinctive prediction to be derived from IAT is 
that the likelihood of criminal violence will be high when 
actors are not particularly sensitive to the moral status of 
the means of action in general. Such actors will lack strong 
internal controls against the use of whatever means are 
expedient in pursuit of their goals, including violent means.
We emphasize the reference to the means of action in 
general in the formulation of our hypothesis. The predic-
tion that the strength of allegiance to a specific legal norm is 
related to the probability of violating that norm is certainly 
plausible but is not particularly original. This prediction 
could be readily translated into the “belief” element of con-
ventional social bonding theory (Hirschi 1969). Moreover, 
the connection between beliefs and violent crime becomes 
tautological if the committing of the crime is regarded as 
definitive evidence of the lack of allegiance to the corre-
sponding criminal law. Persons commit acts of criminal 
violence when they have little respect for the laws prohibit-
ing such violence; the lack of such respect is manifested in 
the violation of the criminal laws. The novel and testable 
prediction to be derived from IAT, in contrast, pertains to 
the “spillover” effect hypothesized as characteristic of a situ-
ation of high anomie. The theory implies that the tendency 
for actors to adopt a calculative orientation to the selection 
of means in non-economic but legal realms of life will pre-
dict the degree of involvement in criminal violence. 
With respect to the relative valuation of institutional roles, 
the prediction from IAT is that actors who perceive eco-
nomic roles to be more attractive and more highly valued 
than non-economic roles are expected to be at comparative-
ly high risk of criminal behavior, including violent crime. 
Such individuals will not be strongly bonded to conven-
tional society through the diverse array of institutional 
attachments and will thus be exposed to weak external 
controls (Hirschi 1969). These perceptions of the relative 
attractiveness and valuation of institutional roles are likely 
to be empirically related to, but analytically distinct from, 
behavioral repertoires. The performances of various types 
of institutional roles depend not only on subjective evalua-
tions but also the opportunity structures and role demands 
confronting actors. Accordingly, an additional prediction 
follows from the vantage point of IAT: actors who tend to 
privilege economic roles over non-economic roles in their 
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actual role performance, especially under conditions of role 
conflict, will be more likely to engage in violent crime.
The hypotheses about individual action considered thus far 
pertain to the balancing and prioritizing of the respective 
roles considered across distinct institutional domains. We 
also suggest that the macro-level condition of economic 
dominance in the institutional balance of power is reflected 
in the nature of the performance of roles within the insti-
tutional complex of the economy itself. Here it is important 
to recall Parsons’ distinction between concrete forms of 
behavior and the institutional element contained in such 
behaviors. The performance of economic roles by definition 
contains a paramount economic element. However, con-
crete interactions, such as transactions in the marketplace, 
can and usually do incorporate to varying degrees social 
elements in addition to the purely economic element.
Fred Block (1990) has proposed the very useful concept of 
“marketness” to capture variation in the social content of 
economic activity. Marketness refers to a continuum that 
essentially reflects the extent to which market transactions 
are “embedded” in more general social relationships.17 At 
one end of the continuum, that of high “marketness,” actors 
are primarily responsive to price signals, and their motiva-
tions for the transactions are purely instrumental (1990, 
51–54). Actors engage in exchanges that are most rational 
in terms of an economizing cost/benefit assessment, and 
the character of these exchanges reflects the orientations of 
homo economicus. The participants are regarded univer-
salistically; there is little affect involved; and the activity 
is highly specific to the task at hand. At the other end of 
the continuum, market transactions are not exclusively 
economic in character. Considerations other than price 
come into play, and instrumental motives are blended with 
expressive motives. 
To illustrate, consider the customer of a convenience store 
who develops an acquaintanceship with the owner and 
patronizes that particular establishment despite higher 
costs of products because the interactions are enjoyable. The 
“marketness” of the ensuing transactions—the purchase of 
commodities on the market—has been lessened, although 
economic institutional roles are nevertheless being enacted. 
In principle, the nature of involvement of a given member 
of a society in economic transactions could be character-
ized with respect to the overall degree of their “marketness” 
(Block 1990, 56). The associated prediction to be derived 
from IAT is that persons who exhibit a high degree of 
“marketness” in their economic transactions will tend to 
exhibit anomic orientations towards social norms and be at 
relatively high risk of involvement in criminal violence.
These arguments about the underpinnings of institutional 
processes in the behaviors of concrete actors suggest an 
individual-level counterpart to the system-level arguments 
of IAT elaborated above. The two sets of arguments can be 
merged into an integrated multi-level model, which is pre-
sented schematically in Figure 1. The inner circles represent 
the realm of individual action, while the outer circles depict 
the associated properties of the social system. At the level 
of individual action, our arguments imply that the risks of 
committing violent crimes will be high for actors: (1) who 
prioritize economic roles over non-economic roles (percep-
tually and behaviorally); (2) who are insensitive to the moral 
status of the means of action; and (3) whose enactment of 
economic roles is high on the “marketness” continuum. The 
specific intervening mechanisms are individual-level ana-
logues to the postulated macro-level processes and are the 
well established proximate causes of crime as enumerated 
in much conventional criminological theory. Specifically, 
individuals with the designated orientations to institutional 
roles and goals, and the designated behavioral repertoires, 
are expected to have weak internal (moral) controls and 
weak external institutional controls.
17 Block’s arguments are informed by the classic 
work of Karl Polanyi (1957 [1944], 1968 [1947]) on 
the “disembedding” of economic activity from 
social relationships as part of the emergence 
of market capitalist societies. For a discus-
sion of the affinities between Polanyi’s ideas 
and IAT, see Messner and Rosenfeld (2000).
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Figure 1: Multi-level model of institutional-anomie theory
Individual action, of course, is nested within a larger insti-
tutional environment. The type of institutional order that 
is hypothesized to generate the criminogenic individual-
level properties in the model is one in which the economy 
dominates the institutional balance of power, anomie is 
pervasive, and fundamental cultural values emphasize 
a disintegrative form of individualism. The institutional 
environment and action in the form of the enactment of in-
stitutional roles and expressions of institutional orientations 
are themselves mutually constitutive, as reflected in the 
wide two-headed arrow. Institutions are created collectively 
by concrete actors, but these creations are in important 
respects external to any single actor. Finally, the level of vio-
lent crime in any society is in the final analysis the simple 
aggregation of discrete acts of criminal violence.
5. Empirical Applications of IAT at the  Macro- 
and Individual Levels of Analysis
An accumulating body of research offers some support for 
key claims of IAT. The most common empirical 
applications of the theory involve efforts to assess the im-
pact of indicators of institutional dynamics on crime at the 
macro-level. For example, several studies have operational-
ized “economic dominance” with reference to indicators of 
social welfare policies and considered how these indicators 
act in concert with measures of the vitality of non-econom-
ic institutions such as family, polity, and school to affect 
levels of crime. The general conclusion to be drawn from 
these studies is that the expansiveness and generosity of 
the welfare state seem to be associated with reduced levels 
of crime, especially lethal criminal violence, either directly 
or by mitigating the effects of other criminogenic condi-
tions, such as economic inequality or economic insecurity 
(Antonaccio and Tittle 2007; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997, 
2006; Pratt and Cullen 2005; Savolainen 2000). However, 
the evidence is mixed, and given the inconsistencies across 
studies, further efforts along these lines are clearly war-
ranted to generate greater confidence in the utility of IAT as 
a macro-level sociological explanation of crime.
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Less attention has been devoted to the cultural dynam-
ics implied by IAT than to the institutional dynamics in 
the macro-level research. This is not entirely surprising 
given that cultural phenomena tend not to be recorded and 
published in standard administrative data sources. Efforts 
to circumvent these limitations by using the World Values 
Survey (WVS) to assess claims in IAT have not yielded 
much support for the theory, although the interpretation 
of the findings is open to question (Cao 2004; Jensen 2002; 
Messner and Rosenfeld 2006). 
More encouraging results concerning the impact of cultural 
factors have been reported by Baumer and Gustafson 
(2007). In a highly innovative analysis, these authors assess 
key propositions from both IAT and Merton’s classic ano-
mie theory (1938) using data on individual value commit-
ments taken from the General Social Survey (GSS) in the 
United States aggregated to counties and county clusters. By 
aggregating individual survey responses to the area level, 
they are able to characterize populations according to theo-
retically strategic cultural constructs such as the strength of 
commitment to monetary success goals and the degree of 
respect for the legitimate means of attaining monetary suc-
cess. They also include several measures of non-economic 
institutional strength (e.g., time spent with family, marriage 
rates, attitudes toward divorce, school expenditures, voter 
participation, welfare assistance) and examine both main 
effects and theoretically derived interaction effects. As with 
most of the research in this field, their analyses yield a com-
plex picture, with some hypotheses receiving support (e.g., 
a criminogenic effect of a strong commitment to monetary 
success and a weak commitment to the legitimate means 
for pursuing success) and others not receiving support (e.g., 
higher level interactions between cultural orientations and 
indicators of the vitality of non-economic institutions). 
Nevertheless, Baumer and Gustafson’s research illustrates 
quite nicely the potential for combining survey-based data 
with records from administrative sources to assess propo-
sitions about both cultural and institutional dynamics 
derived from IAT.
Efforts to apply IAT at the individual level are quite rare. 
One notable exception is a study of a minor form of 
deviance—student cheating—by Muftic (2006). Muftic 
explicitly sets out to assess the “robustness” of IAT by 
operationalizing key cultural and institutional variables at 
the individual level. Her research is based on survey data for 
a sample of 114 U.S. and 48 foreign-born undergraduates. 
Muftic creates scales to measure cultural values associated 
with the American Dream such as individualism, univer-
salism, achievement orientation, and “monetary fetishism.” 
She also constructs indicators of commitment to the family, 
the educational system, the economy, and the polity. 
The results of her analyses provide partial support for hy-
potheses derived from IAT. “[S]tudents with higher adher-
ence to the cultural values of universalism and the fetishism 
of money had a higher likelihood of cheating” (2006, 648).18 
In addition, the indicators of commitment to the family and 
the polity were negatively associated with the probability 
of cheating, as expected. Hypotheses about interactions 
between cultural and institutional variables, however, were 
not supported. The most powerful predictor of self-reported 
cheating by far was place of birth. The U.S. students were 
much more likely to report cheating than the foreign-born 
students.
The most ambitious and sophisticated attempt to apply 
insights derived from IAT at the individual level is the 
research by Karstedt and Farrell (2006). They focus on 
relatively common “morally dubious” acts, which they 
characterize as the “crimes of everyday life” (2006, 1011). 
These include behaviors such as avoiding taxes, not paying 
fees, and claiming benefits, subsidies, and refunds one is not 
entitled to. Karstedt and Farrell develop an elaborate, inte-
grated analytic framework that combines E. P. Thompson’s 
18 As explicated above, “universalism” also charac-
terizes moral individualism. In our view, it should 
therefore not be treated as an isolated variable 
but rather as an element in a broader interactive 
constellation of values and cognitive orientations.
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concept of the “moral economy” with claims from IAT. On 
the basis of this framework, they theorize that a key deter-
minant of the level of involvement in the crimes of everyday 
life is the “syndrome of market anomie.” This syndrome is 
conceptualized as a constellation of normative orientations 
comprised of three dimensions: a lack of trust of others in 
the marketplace, fears of becoming a victim of disreputable 
practices of others, and legal cynicism. 
Karstedt and Farrell test their hypotheses with survey data 
collected from random samples of households in England 
and Wales and the former East and West Germany. They 
estimate structural equation models to assess the impact 
of the syndrome of anomie, treated as a multidimensional 
latent construct, on measures of intentions to engage in the 
crimes of everyday life. Their results in all three regions are 
consistent with theoretical expectations. The syndrome of 
anomie is positively associated with intentions to offend, 
and this syndrome mediates the effects of other relevant 
predictors of offending.
6. Directions for Future Research
The research applying IAT has thus been encouraging, 
but the evidence is obviously quite limited. In particular, 
applications of the theory to understand individual-level be-
havior, such as those by Muftic and by Karstedt and Farrell, 
are rare. We accordingly encourage further efforts along 
these lines. 
We can also propose some new lines of inquiry at the indi-
vidual level that are suggested by our explication of mul-
tilevel linkages above. The prior applications of IAT at the 
individual level have focused on minor forms of offend-
ing—student cheating and morally dubious but common 
misbehaviors in the marketplace. Our theoretical argu-
ments, however, imply that insensitivity to the moral status 
of the means is likely to be a generalized phenomenon. It 
is likely to extend beyond the realm of norms governing 
instrumental behaviors and culturally prescribed success 
goals. We therefore predict that indicators of anomie at the 
individual level, such as Karstedt and Farrell’s measures 
of the syndrome of market anomie, should be capable of 
explaining involvement in serious forms of non-normative 
behavior, including (but not limited to) criminal violence.
We also note that prior individual-level research on the 
institutional determinants of criminal involvement has 
focused primarily on perceptual and attitudinal measures 
(see, for example, Muftic 2006, 642). These are intended to 
capture survey respondents’ subjective evaluations of the 
worth and importance of non-economic institutional roles. 
While such measures are useful and quite relevant to IAT, 
it would also be instructive to develop further and incorpo-
rate into statistical models indicators of “performance rep-
ertoires.” Such indicators could be based on accounts of the 
actual allocation of time devoted to the enactment of roles 
in the respective institutional domains. In addition, reports 
of how role conflicts have been resolved in practice would 
shed light on the extent to which, at the level of individual 
actors, the economy tends to dominate the institutional bal-
ance of power.
It would be quite interesting as well to pursue the line of 
inquiry suggested by Block (1990) and to attempt to opera-
tionalize the “marketness” of economic transactions. Our 
elaboration of multilevel linkages in IAT stipulates that 
economic dominance pertains not only to the balancing of 
roles across institutional domains but also to the manner 
in which economic roles themselves are enacted. Individual 
actors can embed their transactions in the marketplace 
with greater or lesser social content. In principle, it should 
be possible to measure the extent to which the economic 
activity of individuals is in practice more or less socially 
embedded. Our explication of IAT implies that the market-
ness of transactions should be positively related to anomie, 
and through anomie, positively related to criminal involve-
ment, including involvement in violent crime.
In carrying out individual- and multi-level research on 
IAT it will be necessary to include indicators from other 
theoretical perspectives, some of which are theoretical 
“close cousins,” such as Agnew’s general strain theory (1992, 
2006), and others seemingly at odds with IAT, such as Gott-
fredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime (1990). We 
do not view insensitivity to the moral status of the means 
of social action, the marketness of social interactions, and 
the other individual-level attributes and processes we have 
described as the sole source of individual criminality or 
178IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 163 – 181Steven F. Messner et al.: Institutions, Anomie, and Violent Crime: Clarifying and Elaborating Institutional-Anomie Theory
necessarily as competing alternatives to indicators de-
rived from other perspectives. They may also interact with 
indicators from other perspectives such that their effect 
on criminal behavior depends on the distribution of other 
factors, for example, suitable criminal opportunities and 
targets (Cohen and Felson 1979).
The individual-level dimension of IAT, however, does dif-
fer from other individual- or micro-level theories in two 
important and related respects: First, from the perspective 
of IAT, the individual attributes and repertoires that lead to-
ward or away from criminal behavior arise in and, in turn, 
reinforce the defining cultural and structural features of 
whole societies. As such, they should be understood and in-
vestigated in multilevel context. Second, the characteristics 
that distinguish criminals from others in IAT should not be 
interpreted as signs or symptoms of abnormality, pathology, 
or other individual deficiencies or defects. On the contrary, 
they are the normal, expected outcomes of socialization in 
contexts in which anomie is rampant, non-economic insti-
tutions are weak, and disintegrative individualism prevails. 
We acknowledge that further theoretical questions remain 
unanswered in current formulations of IAT. Perhaps one of 
the most basic questions pertains to the origins of economic 
dominance or other forms of imbalance in the institutional 
balance of power. One approach to this issue is to direct 
attention to the decreasing power of the nation-state and 
other political institutions to regulate economic processes 
or to compensate for certain dysfunctional consequences 
they produce in other spheres of social life.19 These pro-
cesses have often been summarized under the heading of 
“globalization”, i.e., the worldwide expansion of markets 
which has been proceeding during the last three decades 
at a much greater pace than the internationalization of 
political decision making (with the development of globally 
effective democratic control structures lagging even further 
behind) (Messner and Rosenfeld 2000). Major dimensions 
and consequences of these processes are: the increase of 
inequality in income and economic wealth in most societ-
ies worldwide (since the late 1970s); increasing poverty rates 
and social marginalization of growing segments of the 
population in many of the economically advanced nations; 
the rearrangement of social welfare regulations moving the 
social-democratic and the conservative type towards the 
“liberal” type, with less generous support and an emphasis 
on rigorous means testing (Esping-Anderson 1990); the 
increase of antagonistic forms of competition between 
states (indicated by falling tax rates on capital and business 
profits) and within states (indicated by increasing rates of 
insolvencies among businesses and private households as 
well as an expansion of advertising and marketing strate-
gies); a concomitant decrease in the level of corporatist 
structures and employment protection; and a decreasing 
level of trust in government, political parties and parlia-
ment. All these developments are likely to be potentially 
criminogenic (Thome and Birkel 2007).20
A final issue that should be addressed by any criminological 
theory with claims to comprehensiveness is the problem of 
punishment. Recent scholarship on imprisonment and the 
“mass incarceration” program in the United States and, to a 
19 Of course, there is a wide spectrum of ideologi-
cal positions regarding the desirable degree of the 
regulatory power of the state. But independent of 
one’s personal ideological position there are clear 
indications that during the last three decades the 
state has generally suffered from a loss of (demo-
cratic) political control over the economy. This is 
partly due to technological advancements (particu-
larly in the means of communication) but also by 
political decision making like the dismantling of 
the Bretton Woods agreement and the liberaliza-
tion of the financial markets (pioneered and pushed 
through mainly by the United States and Great 
Britain). For an analysis of these developments from 
a neo-Marxist perspective, see Harvey (2005).
20 Modern versions of systems theory take a com-
pletely different approach to the questions that we 
are addressing. The answers offered (for example, 
in the work of Niklas Luhmann [1990, 1998]) rest 
on the assumption that there is an evolutionary 
process by which social systems become increasingly 
functionally (rather than segmentally) differenti-
ated thereby forming sub-systems which tend to 
reach beyond national borders. Though “structurally 
coupled” they operate autonomously on the basis of 
“symbolically generalized media of communication” 
(or “exchange”), each subsystem defined by the use 
of a dominant medium which it specifically, and in 
contrast to other subsystems, applies. These are, for 
example, money in the economic subsystem, power 
in the political realm, or proven truth in the realm of 
science. In each subsystem actors seek to maximize 
their own share of the dominant currency in order to 
secure or widen their range of future options. Moral-
ity “falls behind” in societal evolution because it is 
not supported by or rooted in a specific social sub-
system (Luhmann 1990; 1998, 1036–45); it even tends 
to disturb smooth operations within these subsys-
tems. Such a system-theoretic framework shares 
thematic concerns with core claims of IAT about 
institutional imbalances, and it would be instructive 
to derive and test formally complementary and com-
peting hypotheses from the respective approaches. 
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lesser degree, England directs attention to the institutional 
underpinnings of the punishment process in advanced 
societies, but does not integrate theories of punishment 
with theories of crime (Garland 1990; Garland 2001; Sut-
ton 2004). The heavy reliance on formal social control, 
and specifically imprisonment, as a response to crime is 
explicable from the perspective of IAT, particularly in its 
elaborated form presented in this paper. Societies in which 
“soft” behavioural controls have been vitiated by the insti-
tutional dominance of the economy can be expected to rely 
on imprisonment as a means of final resort to control high 
levels of violent crime. We can also expect such societies to 
exhibit an anomic insensitivity to the means by which the 
collective goal of crime control is attained and, therefore, 
to pursue punishment policies such as mass incarceration 
without scruples about the economic, social, and moral 
costs of escalating rates of imprisonment. At the same time, 
crime control through mass incarceration is incompat-
ible with a strong cultural emphasis on the moral worth of 
the individual. In short, the resort to formal social control 
generally and the adoption of a policy of mass incarceration 
in particular are consistent with some of the core claims of 
IAT. One of the most promising aspects of the theory is the 
possibility of integrating explanations of crime and punish-
ment within a single conceptual framework. 
To sum up, IAT remains a work in progress. It emphasizes 
the importance of the larger institutional and cultural 
context for understanding crime and violence, and in 
that sense it seeks to stimulate a thoroughly “sociological” 
criminology. We argue that it is applicable at multiple levels 
of analysis, ranging from that of individual action to the 
dynamics of social systems. However, many core empirical 
claims have yet to be verified, and key mechanisms associ-
ated with the development of forms of social organization 
that are likely to be more or less criminogenic have yet to 
be adequately theorized. Nevertheless, we are hopeful that 
even in its evolving form, IAT will continue to generate 
fruitful puzzles for criminological theorizing and research. 
References
Agnew, Robert. 1992. Foundations for a General Strain Theo-
ry of Crime and Delinquency. Criminology 30:47–87.
Agnew, Robert. 2006. General Strain Theory: Recent Developments and Direc-
tions for Further Research. In Advances in Criminological Theory, Taking 
Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory, volume 15, ed. Francis T. Cullen, 
John Wright, and Michelle Coleman. New Brunswick: Transaction
Anderson, Elijah. 1999. Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and 
the Moral Life of the Inner City. New York: Norton.
Antonaccio, Olena, and Charles R. Tittle. 2007. A Cross-National Test of Bonger’s 
Theory of Criminality and Economic Conditions. Criminology 45:925–58.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 1990. Thinking Sociologically. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Baumeister, Roy F., Laura Smart, and Joseph M. Boden, 1996. Rela-
tion of Threatened Egotism to Violence and Aggression: The Dark 
Side of High Self-Esteem. Psychological Review 103:5–33.
Baumer, Eric P., and Regan Gustafson. 2007. Social Organization and 
Instrumental Crime: Assessing the Empirical Validity of Clas-
sic and Contemporary Anomie Theories. Criminology 45:617–63.
Bellah, Robert N., ed. 1973. Emile Durkheim on Morality and Soci­
ety: Selected Writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bellah, Robert N., Richard Marsden, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, 
and Steven M. Tipton. 1991. The Good Society. New York: Knopf.
Block, Fred. 1990. Postindustrial Possibilities: A Critique of Eco­
nomic Discourse. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Burkatzki, Eckhard. 2007. Verdrängt der Homo oeconomicus den Homo 
communis? Normbezogene Orientierungsmuster bei Akteuren mit unter­
schiedlicher Markteinbindung. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag.
Cao, Liqun. 2004. Is American Society More Anomic? A Test of 
Merton’s Theory with Cross-National Data. International Jour­
nal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 28:17–31.
Cohen, Lawrence E., and Marcus Felson. 1979. Social 
Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Ap-
proach. American Sociological Review 44:588–607.
Cole, Stephen. 1975. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge: Theories of Deviance 
as a Case Study. In The Idea of Social Structure: Papers in Honor of Robert K. 
Merton, ed. Lewis A. Coser, 175–220. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Dicristina, Bruce. 2004. Durkheim’s Theory of Homicide and the Confu-
sion of the Empirical Literature. Theoretical Criminology 8:57–91.
Durkheim, Emile. 1958 [1950]. Professional Ethics and 
Civic Morals. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Durkheim, Emile. 1964a [1893]. The Division of La­
bor in Society. New York: Free Press.
Durkheim, Emile. 1964b [1895]. The Rules of Sociologi­
cal Method. New York: Free Press.
Durkheim, Emile. 1966 [1897]. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. New York: Free Press.
Durkheim, Emile. 1978 [1895]. Crime and Social Health. In Emile Durkheim on In­
stitutional Analysis, ed. Mark Traugott. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Eisner, Manuel. 2003a. Long-term Historical Trends in Violent Crime. In 
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 30, ed. Michael Tonry, 
84–142. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Eisner, Manuel. 2003b. The Long-term Development of Violence: Empiri-
cal Findings and Theoretical Approaches to Interpretation. In Interna­
tional Handbook of Violence Research, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John 
Hagan, 41–59. Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic.
Elias, Norbert. 1982 [1939]. The Civilizing Process, 2 vol-
umes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capi­
talism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fenton, Stephen, ed. 1984. Durkheim and Modern Sociol­
ogy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Garland, David. 1990. Punishment and Modern Society: A Study 
in Social Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
180IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 163 – 181Steven F. Messner et al.: Institutions, Anomie, and Violent Crime: Clarifying and Elaborating Institutional-Anomie Theory
Garland, David. 2001. The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order 
in Contemporary Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gottfredson, Michael and Travis Hirschi. 1990. A General The­
ory of Crime. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Habermas, Jurgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Ac­
tion, translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon.
Hagan, John, Gerd Hefler, Gabriele Classen, Klaus Boehnke, and 
Hans Merkens. 1998. Subterranean Sources of Subcultural Delin-
quency: Beyond the American Dream. Criminology 36:309–41.
Hall, Peter A., and Daniel W. Gingerich. 2004. Varieties of Capital­
ism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: 
An Empirical Analysis, Discussion Paper 04/5, ISSN 0944-2073. 
Cologne: Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung.
Halpern, David. 2001. Moral Values, Social Trust and Inequal-
ity. British Journal of Criminology 41:236–51. 
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberal­
ism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hirschi, Travis. 1969. Causes of Delinquency. Berke-
ley: University of California Press.
Jacobs, David, and Jason T. Carmichael. 2002. The Political So-
ciology of the Death Penalty: A Pooled Time-series Analy-
sis. American Sociological Review 67:109–31.
Jensen, Gary. 2002. Institutional Anomie and Societal Varia-
tions in Crime: A Critical Appraisal. International Jour­
nal of Sociology and Social Policy 22:45–74.
Joas, Hans. 1997. The Creativity of Action, translated by Jeremy Gaines and Paul 
Keast. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, co-published with Polity Press. 
Karstedt, Susanne. 2001. Individualismus und Gewalt: Extreme Modernisierung 
oder Re-Traditionalisierung der Gesellschaft? Ein interkultureller Vergleich. 
In Gewaltkriminalität zwischen Mythos und Realität, ed. Günter Albrecht, 
Otto Backes, and Wolfgang Kühnel, 236–55. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Karstedt, Susanne. 2004. Typen der Sozialintegration und Gewalt: Kollek-
tivismus, Individualismus und Sozialkapital. In Gewalt: Entwick­
lungen, Strukturen, Analyseprobleme, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer and 
Hans-Georg Soeffner, 269–92. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Karstedt, Susanne. 2006. Democracy, Values, and Violence: Paradoxes, 
Tensions, and Comparative Advantages of Liberal Inclusion. Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 605:6–23.
Karstedt, Susanne, and Stephen Farrell. 2006. The Moral Econ-
omy of Everyday Crime: Markets, Consumers, and Citi-
zens. British Journal of Criminology 46:1011–36.
Lehti, Martti. 2004. Long-Term Trends in Homicidal Crime in 
Finland 1750–2000. Paper presented at the 3rd GERN Semi-
nar on “Interpersonal Violence.” Brussels, December.
Luhmann, Niklas. 1990. Paradigm Lost: Über die ethische Re­
flexion der Moral. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Luhmann, Niklas. 1998. Die Gesellschaft der Gesell­
schaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Merton, Robert K. 1938. Social Structure and Ano-
mie. American Sociological Review 3:672–82.
Merton, Robert K. 1964. Anomie, Anomia, and Social Interaction. In Anomie 
and Deviant Behavior, ed. Marshall Clinard, 213–42. New York: Free Press.
Merton, Robert K. 1968. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
Messner, Steven F. 2003a. An Institutional-Anomie Theory of Crime: Con-
tinuities and Elaborations in the Study of Social Structure and Ano-
mie. Cologne Journal of Sociology and Social Psychology 43:93–109.
Messner, Steven F. 2003b. Understanding Cross-National Varia-
tion in Criminal Violence. International Handbook of Vio­
lence Research, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan, 701–16. 
Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic.
Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 1997. Political Restraint of the 
Market and Levels of Criminal Homicide: A Cross-National Applica-
tion of Institutional-Anomie Theory. Social Forces 75:1393–1416.
Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 2000. Market Dominance, 
Crime, and Globalization. In Social Dynamics of Crime and Con­
trol: New Theories for a World in Transition, ed. Susanne Karstedt 
and Kai-D Bussman, 13–23. Portland: Hart Publishing.
Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 2004. Institutionalizing 
Criminological Theory. In Beyond Empiricism: Institutions and In­
tentions in the Study of Crime, vol. 13 of Advances in Criminologi-
cal Theory, ed. Joan McCord, 83–105. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction.
Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 2006. The Present and Future of Insti-
tutional Anomie Theory. In Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theo­
ry, vol. 15 of Advances in Criminological Theory, ed. Francis T. Cullen, John 
Paul Wright, and Kristie R. Blevins, 127–148. New Brunswick: Transaction.
Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 2007. Crime and 
the American Dream, 4th ed. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Muftic, Lisa R. 2006. Advancing Institutional Anomie Theory: A Microlevel 
Examination Connecting Culture, Institutions, and Deviance. International 
Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 50:630–53.
Nisbett, Richard E., and Dov Cohen. 1996. Culture of Honor: The Psy­
chology of Violence in the South. Boulder: Westview.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Eco­
nomic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parsons, Talcott. 1951. The Social System. New York: Free Press.
Parsons, Talcott. 1990 [1934]. “Prolegomena to a Theory of Social In-
stitutions.” American Sociological Review 55:319–33.
Pescosolido, Bernice A., and Beth A. Rubin. 2000. The Web of 
Group Affiliations Revisited: Social Life, Postmodernism, 
and Sociology. American Sociological Review 65:52–76.
Polanyi, Karl. 1957 [1944]. The Great Transformation: The Politi­
cal and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon.
Polanyi, Karl. 1968 [1947]. Our Obsolete Market Mentality. In Primitive, Archaic, 
and Modern Economics: Essays of Karl Polanyi, 59–77. Garden City: Anchor.
Pratt, Travis C., and Francis T. Cullen. 2005. Assessing Macro-
Level Predictors and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis. In 
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 32, ed. Michael H. 
Tonry, 373–450. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rosenfeld, Richard, and Steven F. Messner. Forthcoming. The Normal 
Crime Rate, the Economy, and Mass Incarceration: An Institu-
tional-Anomie Perspective on Crime-Control Policy. In Criminol­
ogy and Public Policy: Putting Theory to Work, ed. Scott H. Decker 
and Hugh Barlow. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Roth, Randolph. 2001. Homicide in Early Modern England, 
1549–1800: The Need for a Quantitative Synthesis. Crime, His­
toire & Sociétiés / Crime, History & Societies 5:33–67.
Ruggiero, Guido. 1980. Violence in Early Renaissance Ven­
ice. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Savolainen, Jukka. 2000. Inequality, Welfare State, and Homicide: Further 
Support for the Institutional Anomie Theory. Criminology 38:1021–42.
Siaroff, Alan. 1999. Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning 
and Measurement. European Journal of Political Research 36: 175–205.
Spierenburg, Pieter, ed. 1998. Men and Violence: Gender, Honor, and Rituals in 
Modern Europe and America. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Sutton, John R. 2004. The Political Economy of Imprisonment in Affluent 
Western Democracies, 1960–1990. American Sociological Review 69:170–89.
Tedeschi, James T., and Richard B. Felson. 1994. Violence, Aggression, and 
Coercive Actions. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Thome, Helmut. 2002. Kriminalität im Deutschen Kaiserreich, 1883–1902. 
Eine sozialökologische Analyse. Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28:519–53.
181IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 163 – 181Steven F. Messner et al.: Institutions, Anomie, and Violent Crime: Clarifying and Elaborating Institutional-Anomie Theory
Thome, Helmut. 2003. Das Konzept sozialer Anomie als Analy-
seinstrument. In Diktatur, Demokratisierung und soziale 
Anomie, ed. P. Waldmann, 37–59. Munich: Vögel.
Thome, Helmut. 2004. Theoretische Ansätze zur Erklärung langfris-
tiger Gewaltkriminalität seit Beginn der Neuzeit. In Gewalt: Ent­
wicklungen, Strukturen, Analyseprobleme, ed. W. Heitmeyer and 
H.-G. Soeffner, 315–45. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Thome, Helmut. 2007. Explaining the Long-Term Trend in Violent 
Crime: A Heuristic Scheme and Some Methodological Consider-
ations. International Journal of Conflict and Violence 1:185–202.
Thome, Helmut, and Christoph Birkel. 2007. Sozialer Wandel und Ge­
waltkriminalität: Deutschland, England und Schweden im Vergleich, 
1950 bis 2000. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Turner, Jonathan. 2003. Human Institutions: A Theory of Soci­
etal Evolution. Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Turner, Stephen P., ed. 1993. Émile Durkheim: Sociolo­
gist and Moralist. London: Routledge.
Varga, Ivan. 2006. Social Morals, the Sacred and State Regula-
tion in Durkheim’s Sociology. Social Compass 54 (4): 457–66.
Wolfe, Alan. 1989. Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Ob­
ligation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ylikangas, Heikki. 2001. What Happened to Violence? In Five Centuries of 
Violence in Finland and the Baltic Area, History of Crime and Crimi-
nal Justice Series, 1–84. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Young, Michael. 1958. The Rise of Meritocracy: 1870–2033: An Es-
say on Education and Equality. London: Thames and Hudson.
Zimbardo, Phillip G., Craig Haney, W. Curtis Banks, and David Jaffe. 
1974. The Psychology of Imprisonment: Privation, Power and Pa-
thology. In Doing Unto Others: Explorations in Social Behavior, 
ed. Z. Rubin, 61–73. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Steven F. Messner
sfm96@albany.edu
Helmut Thome
helmut.thome@soziologie.uni-halle.de
Richard Rosenfeld
Richard_Rosenfeld@umsl.edu
